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Introduction
Generally speaking, historiography has not extensively 
analysed caciquism in Catalonia during the Bourbon Res-
toration. This is largely because it has been difficult and 
complex to explain the existence of this particular socio-
political phenomenon in an industrialised and/or agro-
industrial society, as Catalonia was at the time. In fact, in 
theory the most natural and logical thing would be to as-
sume the full compatibility between political liberalism 
and capitalist development, along with the automatic re-
lationship between caciquism and economic backward-
ness. Fortunately, today this debate – which was quite 
vivid during the 1980s – no longer makes sense because 
comparative and transnational studies have verified that 
caciquism – meant as a kind of political corruption that 
primarily takes shape in election fraud, although by other 
means as well – inherently accompanied the modernisa-
tion process of Western societies since the beginning of 
the contemporary era. Consequently, this phenomenon is 
concomitant with favouritism, political clientelism and 
patronage.1 And it is at the core of one of the hypotheses 
guiding the leading European studies on the history of 
political corruption: the criticism of favouritism or politi-
cal clientelism would have transformed power tech-
niques, which renders it essential to analyse micro-poli-
tics and their modernisation in contemporary societies.2
Within this modernisation process, what were com-
mon and in no way exceptional were the constant ten-
sions and contradictions between the new liberal regula-
tory frameworks governed by the values of freedom and 
equality and their practical application, which was sub-
jected to the erratic dynamic of the interests of the new 
ruling elites on the state and local scale, along with a con-
stant redefinition of these same values according to parti-
san convenience and the social mobility stemming from 
capitalist development. Therefore, these new perspectives 
refute the exceptionalism of the phenomena of caciquism, 
clientelism or the patronage system and instead integrate 
them into more inclusive explanations of the transition 
from liberalism to democracy. Within a political perspec-
tive, the 19th century is thus viewed from alterity itself in-
stead of as a necessary, required step in the transition to-
wards liberal democracy.
Since the 1840s in Spain, the word caciquism has re-
ferred to a negative conception of politics and the exercise 
of power. The most generic meaning of this word and its 
derivates in the same semantic field was the abuse of pow-
er. For this reason, it was readily equated with corruption. 
A quick survey of the different local Catalan newspapers 
from the 1880s reveals the different discursive contents of 
the word caciquism as a synonym of privilege, favourit-
ism, arbitrariness, despotism, irregularity and tyranny, 
among others. Likewise, time and time again caciquism 
was labelled calamitous, oppressive, unbridled, denigrat-
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ing, immoral and despicable. It was viewed as a symptom 
of malaise, “a plague against which all parties and all inde-
pendent people protest”.3 In short, it embodied the worst 
of politics, dirty dealing, politicking and political jockey-
ing, which was opposed to an honest government and a 
sound administration, which are neither irregular nor ar-
bitrary. This vision was broadly shared by the Catholic-
regionalist sectors, Catalanism, Carlism, integrism and 
obviously the different republican families, anarchists 
and socialists. Despite being the leading beneficiaries of 
caciquism, even the parties of the regime criticised it.
The dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy added 
the word “cacique” a bit late, in 1884, defining it as a fig-
ure who exercises excess power in towns. Since the start of 
Spanish constitutionalism, this negative image had been 
attributed to a presumed selfishness in the territories and 
towns, which were more concerned with local finagling 
and power struggles than the general interest of the na-
tion.4 In short, the infamy of caciquism was taken to the 
territories, election districts, local administration and 
their elites. However, in the last few decades of the 19th 
century, caciquist behaviour continued to be reserved for 
the local elites, while “oligarchy” became the universal, 
disparaging word used to describe the state-wide ruling 
class whose malfeasance had denatured the liberal regime 
from the beginning and would have brought the nation to 
decline. The convergence between caciquism and oligar-
chy was the epicentre of the diagnosis performed by the 
regenerationist politician Joaquín Corta based on the re-
sults of the famous survey which he conducted in the Ath-
enaeum of Madrid in 1901, a story which has long been 
told among intellectuals and historiographers even until 
today.5
In this article, we shall seek to contribute to explaining 
how caciquism worked in Catalonia during the Restora-
tion and how it evolved within the context of the emer-
gence of mass politics and society during the early dec-
ades of the 20th century. Specifically, we shall analyse 
how some regional power caciquates formed in the Cata-
lan districts in order to further explore the development 
of caciquist relations; likewise, we shall explain the pro-
cess through which the dynastic rotation in Catalonia was 
destroyed through the condemnation of caciquism, and 
to what extent this entailed true progress in democracy.6
Oligarchic liberalism, executivism and 
government fraud
Since the beginning of constitutionalism, the Spanish po-
litical system traditionally tended to place more weight on 
governability than on representativeness, even with the 
current regime designed by the 1978 Constitution in 
which the reinforcement of governability was once again 
chosen to counter the political instability of the Second 
Republic. This characteristic was quite pronounced in 
19th-century Spain, when governability was guaranteed 
at the same time that citizen representativeness was being 
neutralised in the parliaments, a characteristic that is not 
exclusive to this country but instead can be found in other 
liberal regimes from that period.7 This had a great deal to 
do with the model of liberal state which was being forged, 
which was quite similar to the uniform, centralised model 
in France that was supposed to oversee society as the sole 
legitimate representative of collective interests. However, 
it was also because of the importance of Catholicism in 
political practices.
In Spain during the Bourbon Restoration, just as in 
Portugal during the Regeneraçao, France during Napole-
on III and Prussia under Bismarck, as well as the Roma-
nian constitutional monarchy defined in its 1866 consti-
tution, the struggle for political power centred around the 
executive power. Specifically, in France, Spain, Portugal 
and Romania, the division of powers was barely articulat-
ed and quite limited, as it relied primarily on the pre-emi-
nence of the executive power, with a public administra-
tion that was heavily hierarchised and centralised.8 What 
is more, in Spain during the Restoration, as the 1876 con-
stitution had stipulated, the Crown was in charge of div-
vying up power among the political elites, such that the 
liberal consensus that Isabelline Spain had been incapable 
of reaching was finally achieved. 
Despite this, the regime could only be stable if govern-
ment fraud was systematically committed, as it was neces-
sary to control the election processes from the official es-
tates. Spanish liberalism would have fulfilled its aims with 
this mechanism, albeit at the expense of a notable deficit 
in political citizenship.9 And its most scandalous conse-
quence would have been the denaturalisation of the prin-
ciple of representative government and the consequent 
contempt for the will of the electorate. This contempt 
would retain its impunity with the natural acceptance of 
what was considered its main benefit, namely the moral 
influence of the government. This guiding principle in 
the exercise of power allowed the citizens’ electoral pref-
erences to be guided at the discretion of the government, 
which was regarded as the guarantor and interpreter of 
collective interests.10
Along with the Basque Country, Navarra and the large 
cities like Madrid, Valencia and Bilbao, Catalonia was 
one of the places where the dynastic systems of the Resto-
ration broke down the earliest and the most robustly. In 
consequence, we must identify not only the reasons why 
the dynastic parties in Catalonia were discredited at such 
an early date but also how the different political forces 
realigned and adapted to the new electoral scene which 
was characterised by plurality and competitiveness, and 
what kinds of mechanisms they used to obtain and later 
control their respective power shares, including the prac-
tices of mobilising clientele. At a time when the en-
trenched dynastic rotation and encasellat (ballot manipu-
lation by the Ministry of Governance arranging the seats 
in advance) was more difficult to reproduce and impose, 
especially after the early 20th century, government inter-
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ference was gradually disputed and replaced within the 
electoral districts through mobilisation and electoral 
competitiveness, although they, too, coexisted alongside 
corrupt habits.11
Attention has essentially been focused on the mecha-
nisms of the oligarchic maintenance of political power, 
which can basically be explained by the intra-elitist con-
sensus among the professional politicians from the centre 
in Madrid and the regional elites on the periphery.12 In 
Spain and Portugal, the governments were able to modu-
late the pace of elitist succession with the moderating 
concurrence of the Crown, through dynastic shift in the 
former and rotation in the latter. This also held true in the 
liberal regime instated in Romania just after it gained in-
dependence from the Ottoman Empire; indeed, until 
World War I, no government lost the elections it had or-
ganised.13
The process of adapting this elitist pact to the social 
transformations and the consolidation of a civil society 
arranged around interest groups, given that the pact was 
guaranteed by government fraud and a social patronage 
system, is one of the major gaps that has not yet been fully 
explained. Nor do we know whether the dynastic parties 
adapted to competitive politics, or to what extent caci-
quist policies coexisted with a logic of vertical and hori-
zontal clientele-based control of the vote exercised by dy-
nastic and anti-dynastic candidates, conducted by 
partisan elites willing to compete for citizens’ votes.
That is, we need to discover to what extent elections 
were no longer just another way to legitimise the social 
hierarchies at the turn of the 20th century, as they had 
been in the course of the previous century and as perfectly 
explained by the patrimonial concept of power, or con-
versely to what extent the competitive logic forced a con-
frontation among power groups.14 These elites no longer 
relied on the natural order of society and/or on massive 
governmental fraud but instead on more or less rudimen-
tary party machines and on the dialectic between the po-
litical centre and the regional peripheries, between Ma-
drid and the local elites.
The old debate posed by Salvador de Madariaga – later 
cited by Raymond Carr – focused on ascertaining wheth-
er a brand-new system had died with the pronouncement 
of General Primo de Rivera, or whether a moribund old 
system – the oligarchic regime – had been finished off at 
the end of the Restoration is still undecided.15 This debate 
has vacillated between weighing the vitality of the dynas-
tic forces and the opposition parties, stressing their weak-
nesses and limitations, and highlighting the oligarchic, 
elitist and patrimonial behaviour of the parties in power 
which would have held onto it until the very end, thus im-
peding the democratisation of a regime that would con-
serve its liberal and oligarchic nature. We could further 
this debate with contributions around the origins of the 
Primo de Rivera dictatorship that pinpoint the political 
collapse of the system as the main cause for its authoritar-
ian and praetorian leanings.
“Buffet” politics: Caciquism and 
caciquates in Catalonia during the 
Restoration16
Compared to the enormous vitality of studies of caci-
quism in Spain, primarily from the 1990s, in Catalonia 
this sociopolitical phenomenon has garnered considera-
bly less attention by contemporary historiography. With-
out a doubt, it was a core component that served to iden-
tify, describe and characterise the political-electoral life of 
the Restoration and is therefore inseparable from analy-
ses of the evolution of electoral sociology, yet historiogra-
phy has not striven to explain its significance and func-
tionality. As a whole, it has tended to be viewed a bit 
folklorically in the accounts of the trickery committed to 
falsify election results. Alternatively, it has been associat-
ed with local power relations, often missing plausible ar-
gumentation on the functioning or transformation of cli-
entele-based mechanisms. For example, there has been 
considerably less interest in explaining the content of the 
electoral protests and their legal-political vicissitudes. 
Generally speaking, with the exception of a few notable 
monographs, caciquism has often been naturalised, thus 
rendering it invisible within the political scene of the Res-
toration in Catalonia.
Perhaps this scant attention is related to the survival of 
the interpretative thesis posited by Jaume Vicens Vives, 
which states that caciquism must have been somehow 
beneficial in Catalonia during the Bourbon Restoration, 
and therefore to some extent it must have been indulgent 
with the anti-dynastic oppositions. Generally speaking, 
this caciquism would have relied not so much on violence 
as on the neutralisation or attraction of the political ad-
versary, and essentially, as Vicens states, “by exhausting 
and disillusioning the electors”.17
According to this interpretation, Catalonia as a whole 
was not a land of foreign or carpetbagging government-
placed candidates, as the Catalanists insist; instead, the 
ruling Catalan elite somewhat willingly subjugated itself 
to the designs of the government, despite the fact that 
they only felt like “minsters of Catalan affairs”. The turn 
of the century, the state’s financial and political crisis and 
its inability to assimilate the claims of the workers and re-
gions, along with the push-back against government caci-
quism, led the workers to embrace anarcho-syndicalism 
and the middle classes to feel represented by political Cat-
alanism. And generally speaking, this thesis has remained 
pretty much intact and readily embraced by Catalan his-
toriography. However, it does not consider either the 
unique features of Catalan caciquism, if it existed as such, 
or how it adapted to a new scenario of political-electoral 
competitiveness – which had previously been non-exist-
ent, at least steadily over time – which was ushered in at 
differing paces in 1901-3 and 1907.18
Vicens Vives’ interpretation was the subject of a pro-
found discussion by the Italian historian Gabriele Ranza-
to in a pioneering study on the city of Sabadell, known as 
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the “Catalan Manchester” because of its specialisation in 
the wool textile industry.19 This historian’s hypothesis 
suggested that the bourgeoisie, in Catalonia as well, did 
not necessarily adopt liberal political attitudes, that is, 
that economic liberalism did not necessarily need to be 
accompanied by the values and practices of political liber-
alism. This non-automatic relation seems quite obvious 
today, but within the context of historians’ intense de-
bates on the bourgeois revolution in the 1980s, it was not 
at all so.
Ranzato claimed that the wool manufacturers in 
Sabadell preferred to become hosts of the State, mere sub-
jects, in exchange for the protection of their textile busi-
nesses, for fear of the risks inherent in the free market. It 
is true that Borja de Riquer replicated this thesis, in an at-
tempt to spark a debate, when he claimed that despite 
feeling removed from the professional politicians of the 
Restoration, the Catalan politicians engaged in ballot ma-
nipulation when it suited them. What is more, he argues 
that caciquism was a phenomenon of everyday life, nei-
ther a specific manifestation of the bloc holding political 
power, in allusion to Manuel Tuñón de Lara, nor simply 
an epiphenomenon of political life.20
After this debate, in the wake of the rise in local history, 
the tendency was to monographically analyse caciquism, 
albeit always in association with the dynamic of electoral 
processes and political representation in the districts. 
Studies of caciquism have only exceptionally been con-
ducted within the framework of the social history of poli-
tics, situating them in the transition from the politics of 
notables to the politics of masses. There are very few 
monographs that examine Catalonia as a whole or the 
electoral districts; indeed, they only exist for Lleida and 
Tarragona, while in both Barcelona and Girona there are 
only a handful of analyses and reflections on the local lev-
el.21 What is more, some studies seek to explain how local 
power worked as a specific methodology to analyse caci-
quism. A parallel approach that does indeed seek to be 
comparative is the one I have spearheaded on the political 
modernisation of Catalan cities during the reign of Al-
phonse XIII, which has allowed me to define a model of 
political change that had some common patterns, as well 
as few unique ones, spanning the shifting correlations of 
political forces in the struggles for local power.22 The 
common features are the decline in dynastic forces, the 
hegemony of the oppositions (republican and especially 
Catalanist in the Lliga Regionalista), the re-adaptation of 
political clientelism to serve the inter-partisan struggle, 
the plurality and competitiveness of elections, electoral 
mobilisation, and the politicisation of the street as a pub-
lic space of ongoing political-ideological confrontation 
between opposing political cultures.
Manuel Marin took this one step further in a radically 
different paradigm, the paradigm of the cultural and sym-
bolic history of politics and therefore of caciquism.23 It 
focuses on a case study of urban and industrial caciquism 
which was fuelled by the figure of the wool manufacturer 
Pau Turull i Comadran. With this study – which was 
based on exhaustive research conducted in the extensive 
correspondence conserved in the Turull family’s private 
archive – Marin introduced some of the keys that allow us 
to analyse caciquism as a natural, normal phenomenon 
adapted to urban and industrial settings in Catalan socie-
ty during the Restoration. 
Pau Turull was a prominent man who exerted a great 
deal of authority over the local community and acted as 
the banker of other prominent men of the City of Sabadell 
thanks to his immense fortune. This privileged position 
within the “natural” hierarchy of society led him to mo-
nopolise parliamentary representation through his ability 
to coalesce opposing complicities and interests, even 
from the very federal republicans whose political silence 
he managed to buy, when needed. However, when the 
time came for him to professionalise and take responsi-
bility for the electoral machine – what was called the elec-
toral “crank” or the “manubrio” in the terminology of the 
era – then his obstinacy worked against him and he did 
not manage to stop the mobilisation of the workers’ 
movement, not because of his incapacity but because of 
his failure to adapt. The last dynastic MP elected in the 
Sabadell district was indeed his brother, Enric Turull, 
Figure 1. La Campana de Gràcia, 2 November 1901 - Satirical al-
lusion to the electoral fraud consisting in providing false creden-
tials bearing the name of deceased persons who were not removed 
from the census.
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who won the 1914 general elections thanks to fraud and 
the votes of the “pobles rabassaires” in the district.24
The regime needed professional politicians who could 
feed the ambitions of the governmental parties, not their 
own personal ambitions. The disparaging way that the 
civil governor of Lleida called the tactics pursued by the 
prominent men who did not want to bend to his will “buf-
fet politics” in 1905 alludes precisely to prominent men’s 
obstinate determination to conserve or expand their 
spheres of regional power at the expense of the political 
objectives of the parties they served, which were basically 
the government parties that had to organise the elections. 
Ultimately, two of these eminences, Miquel Agelet and 
Emili Riu, debated the political control of the province of 
Lleida after Sagasta’s death and were faced with the threat 
of the republicans’ ascent. They were both aligned within 
the liberal party yet were thenceforth in opposing fac-
tions, the former a follower of Eugenio Montero Ríos and 
the latter of Segismundo Moret.25 Until 1919, the long-
standing MP for Sort, Emili Riu, did not attain provincial 
leadership. The ministers of governance were forced to 
constantly struggle with personal demands, with the in-
tentions of the opposition candidates, with those of other 
candidates not sponsored by the current government and 
willing to spend money to get elected, and with the claims 
and demands of the districts, such that government ballot 
manipulation particularly in Catalonia since the turn of 
the century was increasingly laborious to deal with until it 
became impossible. In 1914, the government considered 
Catalonia electorally emancipated.
The limitation expressed by the manufacturer and MP 
for Sabadell, Pau Turull, reveals how the “natural” caci-
quates transformed into machines serving the recruit-
ment of clientele votes, through which the political re-
gime of the Restoration sought stability and the most 
important undergirding of its survival. Sometimes these 
caciquates disintegrated as economic diversification in-
creased, leading to the appearance of new elites willing to 
dispute the hegemony of the traditional prominent citi-
zens. This is the story that Joaquim Capdevila recounted 
for the city of Tarragona, which revolved around the fig-
ure of the landowner Enric de Càrcer, a faithful follower 
of Canovism, who was capable of weaving and forging 
stable bonds with the provincial council and with other 
MPs in the Courts from the districts on the Lleida plain in 
a way that was totally alien to the political activism of the 
leaders of these institutions, despite the hegemony of the 
conservative party in the province during the first few 
decades of the Restoration.26
Following the conflict over irregularities related to the 
supply of electrical fluid and water, which was monopo-
lised by a company owned by Enric de Càrcer, an exten-
sive, heterogeneous coalition was formed which included 
liberals, Catholics, Catalanists and republicans, later 
joined by a faction from the conservative party that was at 
odds with that prominent man who had exercised politi-
cal, social and symbolic caciquism for years. Ultimately, a 
political change was being hatched, one that was directly 
associated with the dispersion of new socioeconomic 
classes represented by the industrialists and merchants, 
who were not willing to remain tolerant of the power he-
gemony that the petty nobility had traditionally exercised 
since the 18th century. This small regional capital fully 
entered the era of the politics of mass mobilisation and 
competition for the vote alongside a dynamism in its so-
cial and cultural life, yet another expression of the bur-
geoning modern society.
Thus, we can see two phenomena shaping the caci-
quates in Catalonia during the Restoration. Two para-
digmatic examples of the first one, the old guard, are the 
cases described above, which were either rural, such as 
Enric de Càrcer in Tárrega, or urban and industrial, such 
as the manufacturer Pau Turull in Sabadell. And the sec-
ond was the caciquates which emerged later, partly in re-
sponse to the need to stabilise the parliamentary repre-
sentation of the electoral districts, a tendency which is 
comparable to what happened in the rest of Spain, albeit 
later, after 1914. One example of this in the Terrassa dis-
trict is Salisme, named after the liberal Alfons Sala 
Argemí, who was ennobled by King Alphonse XIII with 
the title of Count of Egara. The early caciquates were 
more closely tied to homogeneous rural or industrial 
economic interests monopolised by patricians, and they 
were the political translation of social relations deter-
mined by patronage, paternalism and bonds of depend-
ency more common and specific to traditional societies, 
with strong roots in local interests or with an impetus 
from industrialisation, yet with a mindset and imaginar-
ies still anchored in the society still heavily dominated by 
communitarian values.
Yet on the one hand, the new caciquates obeyed the 
requirement of professionalisation of parliamentary 
representation, such that their ultimate purpose was not 
only to win legislative elections but also – and more im-
portantly – to retain the seat, while on the other, they 
most likely also reflected a way to counter the masses’ 
access to electoral life by neutralising partisan pluralism 
and electoral competition to the extent possible, consoli-
dating a stable representation by the hegemony exer-
cised by one party or by a cross-cutting power oligarchy, 
such as the Salista movement developed in the city of 
Terrassa. 
Salisme illustrated the consolidation of an oligarchic 
political movement that cut across party lines yet at the 
same time was able to offer individual and collective re-
sponses. It revolved around the manufacturer Alfons Sala 
i Argemí, who monopolised the parliamentary represen-
tation of the district of Terrassa virtually nonstop between 
1891 and 1923, first as an MP and later as a senator. He 
began his political career in the provincial council of Bar-
celona in 1883, and later he won the seat for Terrassa, 
which he gave up when he abstained from submitting his 
candidacy in the 1907 elections, which were easily won by 
the Solidaritat Catalana platform. Salisme, with its right-
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hand men perfectly ensconced in the local, political, cul-
tural and economic institutions of the city of Terrassa, 
was able to appease the workers’ movement and deeply-
entrenched conservative Catalanism, keeping them at a 
remove from Courts.27
The discussion over Salista dominance was gradual, as 
the powerful republicanism condemned the existing elec-
tion machinations which usually took place in the rural 
towns within the district. One of the most irregular prac-
tices which sparked the most widespread rejection in 
public opinion in this district occurred in the village of 
Rellinars in the 1920 elections, where the voting resulted 
in Sala’s victory over the Catalanist republican candidate, 
Domènec Palet i Barba. At that time, a huge snowstorm 
was cited as the reason why the report on election results 
was released with a completely unjustified delay. Howev-
er, the reality of the situation was otherwise. As the chant 
goes – one of the many that circulates about Sala and his 
followers: “Sala said: Let all the dead of the village vote./ If 
you find a paralysed person / make him go vote, too / if he 
can’t do it by himself / he will roll there with the snow”.28
We could also shed light on other forms of regional po-
litical hegemony which sought to keep office through an-
other example, namely the Marquis of Camps, his im-
mense assets and the influence he exerted in different 
counties of Girona. The first Marquis of Camps, Pelagi de 
Camps, was the eighth largest taxpayer in Catalonia in the 
mid-19th century. His son, Carles de Camps i Olzinelles, 
who was affiliated with the Lliga Regionalista, could not 
shed the accusations levelled by the republicans at differ-
ent times in his political career. During the voting in the 
1916 elections, Camps met with the owners and manufac-
turers against the electoral college his village, Salt. In this 
town, according to the newspaper L’Autonomista, the 
Marquis persisted in his efforts to buy votes and provided 
ballots to his tenants and factory workers, “who were later 
watched over from the stairs of the electoral college to 
make sure that they did not change them to reflect their 
own way of thinking”.29
Finally, we should also mention the kind of caciquist 
domination exercised by the Godó family in the district 
of Igualada, which had amplifying effects through the 
control they exerted over Catalan public opinion from 
La Vanguardia newspaper, which they owned. Pol Dal-
mau recounted this story quite skilfully in his doctoral 
thesis which was just published in book form. This histo-
rian seizes on the virtues of the social history of politics 
to shed light on the transition from the politics of nota-
Figure  2. La Campana de Gràcia, 14 
March 1903 - Caricature referring to the 
republican electoral victory in Barcelona 
against the rightist forces.
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bles to the politics of the masses in Catalonia, yet at the 
same time he stresses the symbolic components and cul-
tural representativeness of this manufacturing family 
over a local community in the county of Anoia, as well as 
showcasing the readership of their newspaper, a rising 
source of power during the emergence of mass society in 
Catalonia.30
Despite the fact that the founders of the newspaper, Bar-
tomeu and Carles Godó, fled from the industrial crisis that 
was besieging this region in the mid-19th century and 
moved to Bilbao, where they launched a new business line, 
they nonetheless kept up their family ties at all times (busi-
ness and family were the flip sides of the same coin), as well 
as their ties with the region. The support of their kin and 
political friends in the district served as the foundation of 
their political influence and won them parliamentary rep-
resentation. The family members held onto the seat until 
the 1914 elections. However, in July 1906 Ramón Godó
Lallana, a member of the second-generation, decided not  
to run for re-election as a deputy for the Igualada consti- 
tuency for fear of losing his seat to a broad anti-Cacique 
coalition made up by Carlists, Republicans and Catalanists.  
Ramon Godó detested caciquism, but at the same time he
was in favour of “good caciques” like himself, as he regarded 
him-self as the “natural” MP from the district. This sym-
bolic capital contributed to enhancing his authority and 
public image as a “good” notable, thanks to the social sup-
port he had in the district, as well as his newspaper.
Intense politicisation was unleashed after the end of 
the Godó family caciquate, just as in other districts, 
sparked by the crisis in the wine industry and channelled 
via associations which grouped together the interests of 
the landowning farmers and the smallholders, the share-
croppers who cultivated the vineyards. This politicisation 
has been studied in the town of Hostalets de Pierola in the 
comarca of Anoia.31 The class interests were politically 
expressed via the Lliga Regionalista and republicanism in 
a scenario of electoral competition.
In short, in Catalonia during the Restoration, the exist-
ence of caciquates viewed as spaces of regional political 
domination by prominent families was a common thread, 
although it did not last over time. The caciquates or net-
works of regional power were characterised by a cluster of 
clienteles and loyalties woven around the economic pre-
eminence of a prominent man, family or family line, which 
was sustained on the social influence they exerted over the 
local community, which then had a logical translation in 
the sphere of parliamentary representation. We cannot 
find more or less stable provincial pyramids of political 
leaders beyond the existence of politicians professional-
ised and engaged in government ballot manipu lation.
To the contrary, under the control of the electoral in-
fluence that these professional politicians exerted, we can 
find a transformation of the networks of regional power 
as new economic interests emerged around the turn of 
the century, and as the middle classes organised them-
selves independently of the traditional elites, rendering 
the political representation of the districts and towns 
more plural. We could mention the appearance of repub-
lican movements with regional bases, such as most nota-
bly Marcel·linisme in the districts of Tortosa and Ro-
quetes, as wonderfully studied by Josep Sancho, and the 
political control exercised by the lawyer from Manresa, 
Maurici Fius i Palà, over the industrial villages in the dis-
trict of Manresa.32 Republicans and Catalanists were the 
major beneficiaries of the breakdown of the dynastic rota-
tion in Catalonia at the expense of the parties of the re-
gime, which were not acquiescent but instead tried to re-
adjust to the new situation, albeit to no avail.
Electoral protests, denunciations and 
the fight against caciquism: Political 
mobilisation in an emerging mass society
Despite the scourge brought about by accusations of cor-
ruption and the lodging of protests, the capacity to com-
mit acts of corruption was paradoxically synonymous 
with the possession of power resources. So was the possi-
bility of swaying a court ruling on the validity of the elec-
tions. Thus, the legal appeals of election fraud analysed by 
Josep Noguera in the district of Berga (Barcelona) reveal 
the drive not only to restore the offended honour caused 
by coercion, intimidation and even physical aggression, 
but also to publicly gain legitimacy.33 A veritable symbolic 
battle for power was waged in the elections, and corrupt 
practices were yet another power technique consented to 
by the hegemonic cultural conception of the political lib-
eralism of the Restoration.
Over time, the electoral protests shifted tactics, and 
were also most likely better grounded, although they of-
ten happened after the fact, not at the time of the vote-
counting, and were even replicated by the protested can-
Figure 3. L’Esquella de la Torratxa, 1 September 1905 - Caricature 
referring to voting manipulated by the cacique in favour of the 
ministerial candidates.
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didates. The analysis of the electoral jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court conducted by the lawyer Francisco Agua-
do in 1920 – which covers the period 1910-1916 – stresses 
first the high court’s limitations on accepting the protests 
(it did when it found huge disparities in the distribution 
of the votes) and secondly how they diversified in terms 
of kind and intensity.34 For the district of Barcelona, 
Jaume Muñoz has clearly demonstrated the lower fre-
quency of physical violence and coercion from public 
servants, primarily in favour of the practice of buying 
votes, which was gaining purchase.35 In some towns, even 
the mayors themselves bought votes. Likewise, fraud per-
sisted in different guises: breaking the urns, adulterating 
the lists of voters or filling out the election reports in an 
arbitrary fashion. According to one protest from the 1916 
elections, more voters voted than the number that ap-
peared on the list in the towns of Sant Llorenç de Mo-
runys, La Coma i La Pedra, Guixers and Navès in the dis-
trict of La Seu d’Urgell.
The main problem inherent to studying electoral pro-
tests is their reliability, since they are often lodged after 
the elections were held. And they also increasingly came 
with counter-protests which sought to neutralise the pos-
sible effects of the protest. One example is the district of 
Puigcerdà in the 1916 elections, when the dynastic office-
holder Joan Degàs was pitted against the candidate from 
the Lliga Regionalista, Eusebi Bertrand. Faced with an 
avalanche of protests lodged by Degàs, who requested 
that the elections be nullified, he attached a list of voters 
who claimed to agree with his ideas and the services pro-
vided in the district. However, the high court confirmed 
the validity of the elections.
Public opinion’s gradual awareness of election fraud, 
the extremely powerful regenerationist diatribes after the 
crisis of 1898 and the strength of the anti-dynastic op-
tions in Catalonia led to a scenario in which intolerance 
of the abuse of power and administrative irregularities be-
came an implacable engine of polarisation and electoral 
competition. In the Barcelona district, Manuel Planas i 
Casals, who oversaw the conservative dynastic interests in 
that province, considered this party’s influence shattered 
after its failure in the May 1903 elections.36
Indeed, the conservatives had lost the districts of Ma-
taró, Berga, Sabadell, Vilafranca and Vilanova despite 
having organised the elections. All told, only four con-
servative candidates were elected, along with two liberals, 
four from the Lliga Regionalista, nine republicans and 
one independent. The big winners were the republicans, 
who presented a united front and became the leading 
force in the Barcelona district, while the major losers were 
the dynastic candidates and the Lliga Regionalista. Planas 
argued that one of the causes of the disaster was “the no-
ticeable weakening of the power of the conservatives, te-
naciously combated by Catalanists and republicans and 
not effectively supported by the Government”, which had 
remained neutral given the civil governor’s refusal to in-
tercede. They had to learn this lesson if they were going to 
continue having some kind of power in Catalan politics.37
The condemnatory or protesting tone shifted accord-
ing to the diversification and plurality of interests and de-
mands, and the desire for representativeness channelled 
by the anti-dynastic parties. The Lliga Regionalista con-
structed a corpus of thinking primarily through the writ-
ings of Enric Prat de la Riba, who legitimised its political 
action, whose epicentre was the destruction of what he 
called the “citadel of caciquism”.38 Thus, a new politics 
was constructed, true politics, politics that served the in-
terests of civil society. And thus it became representative 
at the same time as a battle was being waged between the 
dynastic candidates and the Catalanists for the monopoly 
of Catalan political life. The condemnatory campaigns 
against caciquism became particularly visible in the Soli-
daritat Catalana elections held on the 21st of April 1907. 
Caciquism was equated with the dirty politics practised 
by the dynastic candidates, which led to a landslide victo-
ry for the candidates in the Solidaritat Catalana coalition, 
made up of all the parties except the dynastic candidates 
and the Lerrouxian republicans, who earned 41 of the 44 
seats up for grabs.39
However, one thing was the discursive sphere and an-
other was political practice. This tension was brutally re-
flected in the protest and revolt which is known as the 
Avalot dels Burots (revolt of the tax-collectors) in the village 
of Artés (Bages) on the 2nd of January 1917. In this case, 
Figure 4. Demonstration called by Solidaritat Catalana in front of 
Barcelona’s Arc de Triomf on the 20th of May 1906. First large Cat-
alanist mobilisation.
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the caciquism it was combatting was not dynastic but 
came from the Lliga Regionalista in the Castellterçol dis-
trict, where a fief owned by Francesc Cambó that did not 
have a district of its own was part of the village, which was 
also the bargaining chip in the negotiations with the gov-
ernment ballot manipulation.40 In this case, the terms 
were inverted: the carpetbagging or hand-picked MP was 
an anti-dynastic politician, while the local authorities 
leaned towards the Lliga, as well as the landowner and 
provincial MP Antoni Abadal.
Furthermore, in the village of Artés, the Berenguer 
family were manufacturers who were essentially the own-
ers and lords of the village, since they employed 30% of 
the villagers (800 workers were employed in their factory) 
and drove the local economy to such an extent that the 
village merged with the factory and the factory with the 
village, and the chaplain, the doctor and the town hall 
were dominated by the same family and their clientele. 
Even though the Canalejas government had eliminated 
the tax on consumer goods in 1912, it was still charged 
because many small towns were financially asphyxiated. 
In 1917, the purchasing power of the workers of Artés had 
dropped because of the increased cost of living during 
World War I, and because the monopoly led them to earn 
subsistence salaries.
In this context, the increase in this tax in order to pay 
off the debt caused by the failed attempt to channel largely 
unpotable water to the village, which also benefited the 
estate of the aforementioned provincial MP Antoni 
Abadal, was the spark that kindled the villagers’ ire.41 Ul-
timately, this protest was just the tip of the iceberg of a 
more structural problem: on the one hand, the end of the 
Berenguer family’s textile monopoly and paternalistic 
politics, and on the other the condemnation of the lack of 
political representation channelled by the republicans 
through the mobilisation of workers and shopkeepers, 
who were the worst hit by the increase in fiscal pressure. 
The revolt ended with the resignation of the local corpo-
ration, the creation of an union (Associació Obrera 
d’Artés) and the establishment of an industrial coopera-
tive which was later privatised (Tèxtil d’Artés), despite 
the six-month lockout decreed by the Berenguers. The 
consumer goods tax was reinstated, but it was now col-
lected via local distribution, which was much less onerous 
to the local economy. The Lliga lost political control over 
the village forevermore.
Quite a different case was the rice conflict, also known 
as the rice war of the Baix Empordà (Girona), and its po-
liticisation.42 Here we can see the efforts of a dynastic can-
didate to keep his seat in the most mobilised and partici-
pative elections in Catalonia during the Restoration, 
specifically the April 1907 elections. The conflict was 
sparked by a new outbreak of malaria and its impact on 
public health. The Count of Serra and Sant Iscle, Robert 
de Robert, the conservative candidate, who had had the 
district of Torroella de Montgrí enfeoffed for years and 
who oversaw conservative politics in the province of Gi-
rona, sought to become the standard-bearer of anti-rice 
interests. Given the Girona political class’s increasing dis-
tance from the state, it was essential for the government to 
keep hold of the fiefdom of Torroella.43 If the seat were 
lost, conservative politics would be totally expelled from 
that district. For this reason, all the candidate’s efforts 
were funnelled towards spreading the word among elec-
tors about the government’s utmost zeal to care for public 
health.
However, internally the government was not clear 
about the total ban on rice cultivation to stop the cases of 
malaria; nor was the rival, the candidate from Solidaritat 
Catalana, the nationalist republican notary Josep Torras i 
Sampol, channelling the rice-growers’ interests, as Robert 
claimed. It is curious how the anti-caciquist struggle ran a 
dynastic candidate who was purportedly against the rice-
growers, that is, against an imposition of caciquism, when 
in reality Robert only aspired to satisfy the conservative 
government led by Antonio Maura and to secure a life-
time senate seat accompanied by a noble title as a Spanish 
grandee. The person who was actually valiantly defending 
the anti-rice struggle was his rival, who in a side election 
won the seat for the district of Torroella, a vacancy which 
had to be covered after Robert’s sudden and apparently 
incomprehensible resignation. For the conservative poli-
tician, playing the anti-rice card had only been a pretext, 
although he had played it to the hilt, mobilising propa-
ganda resources and undertaking a campaign to wear 
down his rival, who was at the helm of a powerful Soli-
daritat Catalana coalition. However, Torras only provi-
sionally controlled this electoral district because he im-
mediately returned to dynastic obedience.
Rotating coalitions, non-dynastic 
ministerial candidates, horizontal 
clientelism and fragmented oppositions 
During the period 1876-1899, the hegemony of the dy-
nastic parties was virtually absolute, and liberals and con-
servatives earned a shocking percentage of the disputed 
election returns, more than 86%. Between 1876 and 1886, 
they controlled more than 90% of the returns; between 
1891 and 1905, 75%; and after that date only 28%, such 
that the hegemony shifted to the anti-dynastic opposi-
tions, primarily the Lliga Regionalista, the different re-
publican parties and the Carlists.44
After 1901, in the electoral districts where it was impos-
sible to build or maintain permanent caciquates, the elec-
toral dynamics matched the capacity and strength of the 
anti-dynastic oppositions. In the districts where they were 
strong, either the mandates of the Lliga and republicans 
were revived, such as the city of Barcelona, or – more likely 
– coalitions were established between opposing parties or 
their factions and the residues of the governing parties will-
ing to continue the struggle. To the contrary, where the dy-
nastic ruling parties or their clientele had the capacity to 
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lead coalitions, then the opposition parties buckled down 
and sought to garner whatever power shares they could.
These oppositions were heterogeneous, so it was diffi-
cult for them to join forces, except for the great experi-
ment of the unique and exceptional Solidaritat Catalana, 
motivated by the famous events of Cu-Cut which led to 
the approval of the 1906 Law on Jurisdictions that so irri-
tated both Catalanists and republicans because it eroded 
and limited freedom of expression and entrusted the sup-
posed crimes committed against the state and its symbols 
to military jurisdiction.45 Thus, Catalanism was frag-
mented into a large conservative party, which largely re-
placed conservative liberal dynasticism, the Lliga Regio-
nalista, and leftist options represented by republican 
nationalism through different party platforms.46 Howev-
er, we should also note that the progress of the anti-dy-
nastic oppositions was far-reaching and widespread in 
Catalonia, albeit not as uniform as in the rest of Spain, so 
this internal strength automatically translated into politi-
cal weakness within Spain as a whole.
Secondly, some opposition parties were equally capa-
ble of adapting, being versatile and taking advantage of 
the breaches in the political system without disputing its 
underpinnings and the rules of play it afforded them. 
This would largely explain the diversified coalitionist dy-
namic around the existing power correlations in the dis-
tricts, as well as the ability to impose a regional politics of 
alliances in Catalonia developed essentially by the Lliga 
Regionalista, which was always willing to negotiate “dis-
tricts” with the government, the ministerial candidates 
and any other candidates with social and monetary pow-
er, regardless of whether they were Carlist, dynastic or 
even republican.
What is more, despite the recognition of universal suf-
frage for men over the age of 25 in 1891, in practice parlia-
mentary representation was off-limits to a significant 
swath of the population because they did not feel moti-
vated and expressed an intelligent indifference, or be-
cause they felt marginalised in practice as the political sys-
tem revealed itself to be pusillanimous when politically 
integrating citizens because it actually did not believe in 
the true worthiness of suffrage.
In short, after the profound political crisis which was 
triggered by the loss of the last overseas colonies in 1898, 
the Catalan elite began to envision their own strategy, 
which entailed placing the Catalan question on the Span-
ish agenda. In order to do so, they had to gain legitimacy 
at the urns, that is, neutralise the mechanisms by which 
voting was adulterated. Catalonia was one of the sites 
where dynastic power disintegrated the most clearly and 
the earliest, where it was the most evident that the caci-
quist electoral machines stopped collecting the revenues 
meant for the party that governed. The fact that adminis-
trative fraud was gradually receding did not invalidate the 
pursuit of irregular means of getting votes at quite late 
dates, and both the dynastic and the opposition parties 
used these means to increase corrupt electoral practices.
Simultaneously, the status of ministerial candidate was 
devalued to the point that any candidate, not necessarily 
dynastic ones, could earn it if it was in the government’s 
interest. For this reason, as the dynastic formations frag-
mented and the traditional dynastic rule was dismantled, 
another system developed which we call “coalitionist ro-
tation” or “rotating coalitions”, in which Carlists, Repu-
blicans and regionalists were involved alongside the dynas-
tic factions.47 This new rotation emerged in a scenario of 
increasing electoral competition, where alliances and op-
positions could be multiform, not just limited to the rota-
tion which arose in the Barcelona district between the 
Lliga Regionalista and the radical republicans. In conse-
quence, voting authentication was both the cause and 
consequence of an increase in political mobilisation, al-
though this phenomenon was in no way free of persistent 
fraud and corruption.
Despite the differences in criteria which separated the 
dynastic Catalan parties with respect to the state direc-
tions, they were grosso modo accommodated to the rules 
of game of the political regime ideated by Cánovas del 
Castillo. Today, nothing seems to deny the existence of 
caciquism in Catalonia, even though it had different char-
acteristics and rhythms more befitting a much more ur-
banised, certainly more secular and also notably more 
autonomous and articulated society.
These elements which made Catalonia unique within 
Spanish politics include the irregular presence of region-
al caciquates in space and in time; a much less notable 
presence of carpetbaggers installed by the government, 
which was also more nuanced since many of the carpet-
baggers from other regions had kinship ties or had pur-
chased properties in Catalan districts and immediately 
became residents there;48 what is called Catalan-style 
“ministerialism”, which entailed the Catalan dynastic 
parties having some degree of autonomy with regard to 
the national directions dictated by the state and a repro-
duction of the peculiar dynastic rotation in the sense that 
Catalonia was not a priority in the development of ballot 
manipulation and that the major politicians of the Resto-
ration did not have any districts there; the breakdown of 
the dynastic rotation at quite an early date, between 1901 
and 1907; the existence of powerful anti-dynastic, Cata-
lanist, republican and traditionalist oppositions with 
which the cabinets had to negotiate ballot manipulation; 
and finally, a negligible presence of article 29 of the 1907 
electoral law which allowed candidates without rivals to 
be declared the victors immediately, a practice that was 
rather widespread in the regions of Galicia, the two Cas-
tiles and Andalusia.
And we could add yet another difference compared to 
Spain as a whole: the suspensions of town halls, mayors 
and city councillors agreed to by the civil governors, a re-
curring practice which the cabinets used on the eve of 
elections in order to influence the electoral results, was 
also negligible. Thus, between 1915 and 1923, only 102 
city councillors (1.4% of the total in Spain), 11 mayors 
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(2.1%, and none in the Barcelona district) and 7 town 
halls (1.7% and none in Tarragona) were suspended.49 
The number of suspensions determined by the Minister 
of Governance was slightly higher, although equally neg-
ligible: 23 out of the 544 in Spain as a whole (4.2%), and 
they all took place in the last general elections held just 
before the Primo de Rivera dictatorship seized power.
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